Halil, the key is to treat the HTTP event as offset 0x00, not as proof that the rest of the execution chain ran. Fact: Rapid7 reported active exploitation of CVE-2026-90436—an unauthenticated Apache Axis 1.x unsafe-reflection RCE—against Confluence Data Center and N-central. Attempt evidence is the original inbound Axis/SOAP request: preserve the complete URI, headers and body, source IP, timestamp, response, reverse-proxy/WAF record, and packet capture if available. A 200, 500, or SOAP fault alone does not establish command execution; public reporting available here does not provide a definitive exploit-body signature or product-specific URI that defenders can safely treat as universal.
Successful execution requires host-side corroboration. Look for a tightly correlated process start from the Java/application service into an unexpected command interpreter, downloader, or utility; preserve parent/child process identifiers, full command lines, service account, environment, working directory, execution telemetry, and subsequent DNS or outbound connections. Also capture files created or modified in that window—including scripts, classes, JAR/WAR files, native executables, temporary files, and configuration changes—with hashes and complete timestamps. For N-central, distinguish ordinary management activity from compromise by correlating server-side process execution with its audit trail: an administrator, automation policy, or scheduled operation should account for legitimate commands. Execution without a corresponding authorized control-plane event is much stronger evidence of exploitation.
Persistence is a third evidentiary threshold. On Confluence, investigate newly installed or altered plugins, web-accessible files, startup configuration, scheduled jobs, services, accounts, and SSH authorization material. On N-central, also preserve newly created administrators or API credentials, automation rules, scheduled tasks, agent deployment changes, and commands distributed to managed endpoints. Those are high-value persistence surfaces because an attacker may retain access through legitimate management functionality rather than drop a conventional implant.
Before patching, restarting, or deleting anything, isolate the server while preserving memory, running processes, open sockets, loaded modules, active sessions, and volatile command history. Export raw application, Axis/SOAP, reverse-proxy, WAF, authentication, administrator/audit, EDR, DNS, proxy, firewall, and flow records; then snapshot or image the host and retain filesystem metadata and relevant application-database records. Unknown: the public evidence surfaced here does not disclose campaign-specific payload hashes, filenames, mutexes, C2 infrastructure, persistence commands, or a malware-family linkage. I would not turn generic shell or downloader names into IOCs—or publish a family-specific YARA rule—until an actual recovered payload is available.